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Liberty, Equality, and State
Responsibilities
REVIEW OF COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER’S WHEN THE
STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?
Robin West†
Corey Brettschneider’s When the State Speaks confronts a
core dilemma for liberalism and indeed for liberal states: how
(and whether) liberal states should respond to the existence of
hateful speech and practices, and the groups that sponsor and
promote them. Brettschneider advocates for an approach that
checks the damage the hateful speech does to underlying liberal
principles of free and equal citizenship, while at the same time
respecting the rights of the speakers and groups that engage in it.
He rejects what he considers to be the two polar responses that
pervade state responses, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, to this
dilemma, and that virtually exhaust the scholarly treatment of
the issue, at least in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.
On the one hand, Brettschneider rejects the civil libertarian
(or “neutralist”) claim, popular in the United States, that private
speech is just that—private—and therefore of no concern or
relevance to public values, public deliberation, or public law. He
likewise rejects the “militant democrats” (his phrase), some
feminists, and most of the European liberal democracies, who
argue that private hateful speech has very harmful and fully
intended consequences and should be banned or censored in some
meaningful way to stop its noxious spread.1
These two poles, Brettschneider argues, veer toward one
or the other of two dystopian visions of the relation of the state
to its citizens. The “militant egalitarian’s” view, which urges
greater criminalization of hate speech, risks what he calls the
“Invasive State,” meaning a state overly involved in our private
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Part of this review
has been published as a part of Liberal Responsibilities, 49 TULSA L. REV. 393 (2013).
1 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?:
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 1-3, 5 (2012).
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lives—the traditional bogeyman of civil libertarians everywhere.2
The liberal or neutralist view, on the other hand, according to
which the state is and should be fundamentally unconcerned with
the content of private speech, no matter how hateful or indeed
how consequentially harmful, risks what he calls the “Hateful
Society.”3 In this dystopia, all rights and liberties are vigorously
protected, but hate runs like an open sewer, undercutting the
reasons we have rights in the first place. Under such a regime,
some groups of citizens—women, racial minorities, gay and lesbian
citizens—are frequently and even routinely subjected to hateful
practices and utterances.4
The question Brettschneider raises and tries to
answer in the book is how we can steer a middle course
between these undesirable societies. On the one hand is the
Hateful Society, in which rights are protected but hate runs
rampant, resultantly feeding a lesser regard for the equality
of citizens. On the other is the Invasive State, in which hate
is checked but the state is a far-too-intrusive censor into our
private lives, risking the protection of all speech, and thus
compromising the joy and value those deeply human
activities and attributes bring.
Brettschneider’s provocative suggestion is to introduce a
third possibility, fully captured by his introduction and
descriptive account of the “Persuasive State.” The Persuasive
State, unlike the Invasive State, refrains from coercion, and
thus avoids the invasive state’s pitfalls. However, it also
recognizes the relevance to public values of privately held and
promulgated hateful beliefs, including those promulgated
within the family and within religious traditions.5 It can
thereby at least attend to, though it is uncertain whether it can
fully counter, the dangers of the Hateful Society.
Brettschneider argues that the state should seek to
persuade citizen holders of hateful beliefs to transform, modify
or drop their hateful beliefs, to whatever extent those beliefs
conflict with public democratic values, notably, values of free
and equal citizenship. Thus, in effect, the Persuasive State
counters hateful speech with argument—argument that hateful
beliefs undercut the very values of free and equal citizenship that
undergird the rights enjoyed by the holders of those beliefs
2 Id. at 10.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 10-11.
5 Id. at 12-19.
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themselves. Perhaps those with hateful views will be persuaded,
and will drop the views. But even if not, other citizens will hear
the dialogue, the result being that the state will have been
respectful of the equal rights of all and will not have been
complicit in the spreading of beliefs that fundamentally undercut
liberal democracy. Indeed, the state has a moral responsibility to
engage in this speech; it owes it to the victims of the hate speech it
protects, and to the greater mandates of constitutionalism and
liberalism. It is essential to the stability, fraternity, and equality of
the community that the hate speech it protects seeks to undermine.
I am largely sympathetic to this project. I think it is
entirely right for us to recognize the relevance of private hateful
beliefs to public values such as equality and freedom, equal
respect, and due regard. I also agree that it is entirely right for us
to shift our focus somewhat from concerns about the state’s
overuse of its coercive role to the possible good a state can do
when it acts in its persuasive capacity. And I think it is right
and extremely important that we move our attention from
debates over individuals’ rights to engage in hate speech to the
state’s responsibilities to respond to it and what the state
should say in response.
This is a refreshing change of focus. Brettschneider shows
us how to think of the state as a fully moral actor in this ongoing
liberal project, leaving behind the two roles our traditional
debates on this issue have articulated for it: roles as the generator
of unconstitutional laws that inhibit speech, or the sometimes
overly zealous protector of individual rights to engage in it. The
state is more complex than this simplistic dichotomy and can
multi-task with the best of us. One thing the state can and
should do, Brettschneider wisely points out, is publicly make
the case for the liberty and equality for which rights exist. This
is particularly important where the speech those rights protect
undermines the values free speech is designed to serve. That
insight alone, and that prescriptive suggestion for change, is a
contribution to First Amendment doctrine and theory, as well
as to our understanding of equality.
However, there are problems, largely of coherence, that
make it hard to understand the full import of Brettschneider’s
proposal. I will focus on three such problems, as well as some
more substantive objections, providing suggestions for addressing
these issues.
First, it is truly difficult to understand who and what
Brettschneider is talking about when he talks about state speech,
or what he could possibly envision by suggesting that the state
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take up and use the microphone pictured on the front jacket cover
of this book. The state does, after all, already “speak” and attempt
to persuade constantly; it is never quiet. The state speaks when it
passes laws; when it justifies them in judicial decisions; when it
promulgates administrative regulations and adjudicates those
regulations; when it imposes sanctions in civil cases; when it
educates children in public schools; and when it imprisons, fines,
and executes people. Almost all of that speech, furthermore, is
“persuasive.” Persuasive state speech is as present as air. Of
course the state could and should use its rhetorical powers to
promote liberal values of equality and freedom, equal respect,
due regard, and human dignity. It already does this, but there
is no reason it should not be urged to do so both more, and
more reflectively and effectively. There is also no reason that
the state should not do so in the specific context of hate speech
and pornography. This is what I take Brettschneider to be
urging, and I support the effort.
It would be a much clearer proposal, though, if he specified
what sort of “speechifying” he has in mind. In the last chapter, he
suggests doctrinal changes to our First Amendment case law that
would give executive branch officials greater latitude to deny tax
exemptions and deductions (as well as affirmative grants) to even
purportedly religious groups that engage in hate speech.6 This is
the first example Brettschneider provides of the sort of persuasive
state speech he is urging, finally giving some context to an
otherwise vague suggestion: “persuasion” apparently includes
the act of denying tax exemptions and withholding economic tax
dollar support, and the “Persuasive State” apparently includes
the state that so withholds.
But Brettschneider seems to have in mind more than this
doctrinal change that comes late in the book and late in the
argument. It would have been helpful if he had simply provided
more examples of the sorts of state speech he envisions. For
example, a thorough treatment of issues surrounding public
education (which he does give some cursory attention)7—from
struggles over the content of curricula and school textbooks, to the
merits and perils of unregulated homeschooling—might have
been a good place to start in putting a bit more meat on the bones
of what is otherwise a somewhat empty, although aspirational,
exhortation: the state should engage in more liberal moralizing.
6 Id. at 161-63.
7 Id. at 96-104.
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Second, there seems to be something unrealistic, and a bit
naïve-sounding, about the nature of the hate speech Brettschneider
seeks to both protect (through traditional First Amendment
doctrine) and counter (through the persuasive efforts of the liberal
state). Brettschneider writes as though that speech is largely
ideological, spawned in political groups such as the KKK, private
organizations such as the Jaycees, or in families that have and
transmit to children overtly racist or sexist world views.8 The
counter to such bad ideas, Brettschneider sensibly maintains, are
good ideas. What the state should do, then, about these groups
with their wrongheaded and inegalitarian ideologies, is not censor
them, but persuade their members that they should abandon
their beliefs, at least to whatever degree they conflict with a thin
and liberal conception of equal and free citizenship. That is,
families that teach their daughters to accept a lesser and
subordinate role than men,9 groups such as the Jaycees that teach
their members to accept discriminatory membership policies, the
Boy Scouts with their homophobic refusal to acknowledge the full
humanity of gay men and boys,10 and groups such as the KKK that
spread genocidal messages of hatred and contempt,11 should not be
censored. Rather, their members should be exhorted not to harbor
their false beliefs. The members should in turn listen, and then
change their beliefs accordingly. (It sounds a bit like Romney’s
“self-deportation” solution to the immigration problem.) The state
should, in effect, reason and argue, not punish. If it does, it will win
the argument, and that’s that.
There are two problems with this part of Brettschneider’s
prescriptive claim. First, at least sometimes, hate speech is
motivated not by worked out noxious ideologies, such as a
doctrinaire belief in white supremacy or male superiority, or any
other set of beliefs, but rather, by literal hate, pure and simple.
Its targeted audience is not society in general, reachable through
marches or rallies in the public square with signs and cross
burnings, but rather a particular teenage girl, or a gay boy, or an
insecure and vulnerable tween, targeted through harassing
speech and images on Facebook. That harassing and harmful
speech spawns not just feelings of inferiority, but self-inflicted
cuttings, eating disorders, and suicides.
8 Id. at 8, 72.
9 Id. at 54.
10 Id. at 130-32.
11 Id. at 8.
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What prompts it? Of course, sometimes ideology plays a
role: the harasser thinks, wrongly, that women or gay boys or
black children are of lesser worth. If he or she could simply
understand the wrongness of that belief the behavior would stop.
But, at least sometimes and perhaps more often than not, that
speech is the product of twisted psyches rather than noxious
beliefs—not the sort of mindset to be changed through persuasive
state-sponsored speech. Brettschneider seems to have forgotten,
or just underplayed, the role of the “hate” in the hate speech he
rightly deplores. Hate speech is not solely the product of wrong
beliefs; it is also the product, in part, of hate.12
Second, and relatedly, it is difficult to buy into
Brettschneider’s insistence on the moral responsibility of people
who hold these noxious views to change them so that they accord
with the minimal decency required by liberal principles, and that
the state should be engaged in the project of exhorting them to do
so. Is it really morally incumbent upon everyone who harbors
these false beliefs to listen to the state’s arguments against them
and change their beliefs accordingly? Consider the families that
keep their children home so as to avoid the liberalizing content of
a public school education, and teach their daughters submissive
and lesser roles, or the boy who torments his gay peers, or the
white housewife who despises her black neighbors and lets them
know it. Presumably, these individuals dislike the egalitarian,
assimilationist, and integrated liberal state and its exhortative,
persuading ways, at least as much or more as the loosely liberal
feminist and egalitarian ideas of gender and race equality the
liberal state promulgates.13 Like teenagers who are spurred on to
double their consumption of cigarettes and alcohol by public
health campaigns, surely illiberalists will be spurred to greater
contempt for any state that tries to persuade them out of their
entrenched habits of thought, feeling, and child raising—habits
that have at their core, not periphery, fear of and contempt for
a state that preaches liberal values.
It is difficult to comprehend what is meant by the claim
that the liberal state should exhort people who hate the liberal
state precisely because of its tendency toward exhortation of
views they despise. It seems imprudent to advocate that the
state’s solution to citizens stating, for example, “I hate the state
12 For a very different description, see DANIELLE CITRON, HATE 3.0: THE RISE
OF DISCRIMINATORY CYBER HARASSMENT AND HOW TO STOP IT (forthcoming).
13 For an account from a judicial decision adjudicating a conflict between
such a family and a public school, see Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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because it beats up on me,” should be to continue bullying these
citizens until they change their beliefs that a bullying state that
beats up on them is something they hate. The very attempt at
persuasion may very well underscore precisely what extreme
anti-liberals find so hateful about the liberal state; it is what
spurs the fringes among them to arm themselves in defense
against black helicopters. Persuasive exhortatory politically
correct talk by the liberal state, in other words, will backfire—just
ask any teenager. Thus, Brettschneider’s proposal would have
been stronger had he specified more carefully the kind of hate
speech he is targeting, and the kinds of responses that are
envisioned, when he speaks of acts of state persuasion.
I also identified some substantive problems with the
proposal itself: that the state’s response to hate speech, contra
the censorship urged by militant democrats and contra the blind
eye turned by civil libertarians, should be to engage in various
acts of persuasion. There are three separate problems that I see.
The first is a general worry about the way Brettschneider has
characterized the Persuasive State as an alternative to his two
dystopias: the Invasive State on the one hand and the Hateful
Society on the other. Brettschneider’s Persuasive State is a well-
intentioned, completely functional, and thoroughly liberal state,
not beset by public choice woes, or administrative capture, or
excessive corporate and private power, or know-nothing voters,
politicians and their political parties, or noxious factionalism,
or sagging economies, or even external threats. It’s a pretty
utopian state. Of course, it is also a hypothetical and idealized
construct, meant to rhetorically counter the two dystopias he
portrays, and which are implied by the poles of debate he is
seeking to interrupt. It is not intended to describe any actual
state, liberal or otherwise. Nevertheless, there is an odd blindness
in Brettschneider’s project to the distinctive dystopic possibilities
to which his own utopian alternative might give rise.
Bluntly, it seems to me that in addition to the two
dystopias that drive Brettschneider’s project—the Invasive
State and the Hateful Society—he might have added a third,
implied by his own proffered alternative: the Hypocritical State.
Just as the Invasive State is the dystopia masked by the
egalitarians’ political aspirations, and the Hateful Society, the
dystopia implied by the civil libertarians’, so the Hypocritical
State, I suggest, is the dystopia possibly masked and legitimated
by Brettschneider’s proffered alternative. Sometimes, when
actual liberal states speak of the values of equality, diversity, and
liberty, they are doing so at the very moment they are pursuing
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profoundly inegalitarian, stultifying and oppressive ends. All that
egalitarian persuasion might be toward the end of distracting
people from the inegalitarian acts it is undertaking. In this
dystopian vision of Brettschneider’s proffered alternative,
“state persuasion” is designed, roughly, to drive the listener
crazy, by insisting the state is doing the opposite of what it is
doing at that very moment. Sometimes, the Persuasive State’s
egalitarian and freedom-respecting rhetoric is cover for actions
that are viciously inegalitarian and disrespectful—even hateful.
Sometimes, to use the critical language of the 1970s and 1980s,
the Persuasive State is the “legitimating state”—its equality and
freedom-promoting rhetoric is a cover for deeply illiberal
impulses.14 In my view Brettschneider should have worried about
that possibility, at least a little.
We need look no further in our own contemporary society
than the very high-minded liberal, liberty enhancing, and
thoroughly moral justifications that various state actors—
Supreme Court Justices, ninth grade civics teachers, state and
federal prosecutors, pro bono lawyers from prestigious private
law firms, judicial opinions by the bucket-load, and academic
lawyers in the field—proffer, when discussing norms of our
criminal law and procedure. Juxtapose all that equality and
liberty-promoting rhetoric about presumptions of innocence and
the dignity-protecting rights of the worst criminal defendants,
with the reality of our grotesquely dysfunctional criminal
justice system, promulgated by those same state actors,
that incarcerates more citizens per capita than some of the
most ghastly, illiberal, and totalitarian dictatorships on the
planet. The same “state” that speaks of the dignity, equality, and
respect owed to criminal defendants, when justifying criminal
law, imposes penalties for the possession of crack cocaine at one
hundred times the harshness as possession of powder cocaine,
and life sentences for trivial and victimless as well as unproven
crimes, executes prisoners in the face of proffered and
14 For examples from critical literature, see, e.g., Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (legitimating function of antidiscrimination rights and
rhetoric); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 195, 220 (1987) (legitimating function of contract rhetoric of freedom and
equality, while law in fact serves ends of economically dominant); Morton J. Horwitz,
Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 398-99 (1988) (legitimating function of rights to
serve propertied interests); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1387
(1984) (legitimating function of first amendment rhetoric of freedom of speech and thought,
while law serves corporate ends); Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-
Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1408-09 (2009) (legitimating
function of privacy rights).
2014] LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND STATE RESPONSIBILITIES 1039
unexamined evidence of innocence and does so in a way that
disproportionately kills African American citizens, and targets
citizens abroad for execution on hidden evidence of their alleged
complicity with terror presented in secret tribunals.
The Hypocritical State or the Legitimating State (or the
lamp-posting state) legitimates all of this mayhem and random
violence it inflicts with high-flying language justifying its
sanctions in terms completely congenial to liberal rights. It
employs the rhetorical mechanisms of persuasion, in other words,
so as to coercively impose its mandates in ways that express its
utter contempt for the very moral and liberal values it self-
righteously, loudly, and repeatedly extols.
Surely the Hypocritical State is a danger worth
attending. But Brettschneider does not at all address this
possibility. Rather, the Persuasive State of Brettschneider’s
imagination utters and deeply believes liberal and democratic
values, particularly the value of equal and free citizenship. There is
no risk of hypocrisy anywhere in sight. The extraordinary gap
between the liberal persuasive state and the liberal incarceral and
executing state may be the largest in the criminal justice field, but
it by no means resides solely there. It may, in fact, also reside in
the distance between the rhetoric of equality that it deploys, and
that Brettschneider wants it to deploy more loudly, and the wide
berth it gives to the hate speech it tolerates. In other words, the
Persuasive State of Brettschneider’s imagining might just be
protesting a bit too loudly. It seems to me that particularly those of
us attracted to the idea of the Persuasive State, and its potential
for good, need to worry about this legitimating function of the
Persuasive State, and to try to find ways to counter its influence.
The second substantive problem regards the myriad
purposes served in Brettschneider’s book by the line drawn
between the Persuasive and the Coercive State, or the state
when it is acting in its “expressive” mode, and when it is acting
in its coercive mode. The distinction is a vital one in the book,
not just theoretically but practically. It lies at the heart of the
most helpful doctrinal reform Brettschneider advocates: that First
Amendment law, and particularly the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, be redrawn so as to unequivocally permit the state to
refuse to fund groups that sponsor illiberal beliefs—even where
those groups do so under cover of religious dogma—through
withholding either direct grants or tax exemptions and deductions.
The liberal state cannot and should not censor the
expression of offensive beliefs. The liberal state should not slide
into the Coercive State and, for the most part, cannot by virtue
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of the First Amendment. The Persuasive State, though, can and
should respond to the content of the ideas it is required to
protect, and one way it can respond is by refusing to assist those
groups in the marketplace of ideas. This important suggestion,
though, obviously depends quite heavily on the distinction, if it
can be maintained, between the “Coercive State” and the
“Persuasive State.”15 According to Brettschneider, “persuasion”
includes, notably, the act of withholding tax exempt status, and
refusals to extend grants.16 However, as he notes, the Supreme
Court for the most part disagrees, as do many commentators.17 A
bit more development of the meaning of “persuasion,” “coercion,”
or both, might have helped bridge the gap between them.
More generally, though, the distinction Brettschneider
draws between the coercive and persuasive states is a little too
black and white, even aside from its application to the problem
of tax exemptions for religious or other groups that promulgate
hate. The state does many things, at least some of which are
not easily categorized as clear examples of coercion or
persuasion. Tax deductions and exemptions are just one such
close case. There are other borderline cases as well. The state
also regulates and coordinates across vast areas of social life, all
of which can be understood as either “coercion” or “persuasion”
under sufficiently broad definitions of either term.
Here is one example of a potentially ambiguous case, which
is completely undiscussed in Brettschneider’s book, but which is of
direct relevance to his general thesis. The “state” administers a
system of private law, including an array of tort remedies, so that
citizens can pursue, through actions for monetary damages, some
measure of corrective justice when they have been wronged
without turning to the punitive “coercive” arm of the state. The
state obviously facilitates these private actions. It is also in some
sense responsible for the doctrine under which those actions
proceed. It isn’t clear, though, in Brettschneider’s treatment, where
this private-rights-and-private-remedies-providing function falls.
Does the state’s provision of tort remedies for private wrongs
constitute “persuasion” or “coercion?” It is not clear. It is also not
clear where Brettschneider might think it falls, particularly given
that he considers the construction of incentives and disincentives
created through tax structures or the withholding of largesse from
15 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 13, 109.
16 Id. at 128-40.
17 Id. at 137-40.
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the public purse, examples of “persuasion” despite their arguably
categorically coercive consequences.
It is a question, though, that is of obvious relevance to
the issue that absorbs the book: the regulation, or recognition
of hate speech, and the state’s response to it. The distinction
between the criminal law—which is clearly coercive—on the
one hand, and regulatory or tort regimes—in which the state
provides the forum and determines the remedy but private
parties bring the actions—has been of vital importance to lawyers
seeking to provide remedies for victims of hate speech without
encroaching on First Amendment rights.18 Brettschneider’s
overall project is somewhat aligned with that of these lawyers, at
least in its goal; he too wants to figure out a way to respond to the
anti-equalitarian content of hate speech without offending First
Amendment guarantees. Thus, he might have looked a little more
closely at some of those campaigns.
For example, at least parts of the failed anti-pornography
ordinances of the 1980s pursued by Catherine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin were specifically designed so as not to employ
the punitive arm of the state. What was envisioned in some
parts of those ordinances were civil actions for civil remedies,
contemplating the imposition of monetary damages to be paid
to the victims of pornography by purveyors; not punitive
actions involving the criminal law, the state, and jail time. Do
those actions, and the state’s facilitation of them, constitute
exemplars of “coercion” or “persuasion”? It seemed to the backers
of these ordinances that the state’s role in these actions was what
Brettschneider calls persuasive, not coercive. I suspect that
Brettschneider would disagree. But if so, this needs a defense. Is
the state’s role in facilitating private actions for the harms done by
hate speech or pornography, so injurious to the rights of purveyors
to justify a ban on even such civil actions? This goes quite a bit
further than what seems to be argued in the text, which is that
criminal sanctions on hate speech would do such injury.
Recognizing the violations of rights arguably occasioned
by criminalizing various forms of hate speech by no means
implies that a state which permits civil actions for those harms,
followed by the imposition of monetary damages, also violates
those rights. Rather, it appears to require only that the speakers
internalize the harms occasioned by that speech, when the
18 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination,
71 B.U. L. REV. 793, 804 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25 (1985).
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speech violates the civil rights of others, with the phrase “civil
rights” there understood in its original and ordinary way: rights
to dignity, to bodily integrity, and to be free of the fear of assault
in both society and cyberspace. The state provides the forum—the
courthouse, court personnel, and the cause of action—such that
those civil rights can be vindicated in the form of private actions.
It seems to me that the state is performing a persuasive, and not
a coercive function, when it acts as such. But if there is a claim to
be made to the contrary, it isn’t spelled out in this book.
Another way to put this concern is that it isn’t clear
where civil actions, as opposed to criminal sanctions, for hate
speech and pornography would fall on Brettschneider’s
schematic divide between “coercive” and “persuasive” state
functions. The state acts through common and constitutional tort
law so as to inhibit or deter a wide range of speech acts, involving
an equally wide range of types of harms. Thus, the state defines
as “tortious” various types of libel, slander, fraud, blackmail,
perjury, assault, stalking, harassment, group defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Some of these, of
course, are also crimes.) Likewise, it defines as actionable various
breaches of contract, copyright, patent, and trademark rights,
virtually all of which also involve nothing or almost nothing but
speech and speech acts. All of these torts and contract or
copyright violations are occasioned by speech acts, and they all
give rise to civil sanctions. The speech in all of these cases, like
hate speech, does things, and (arguably) by so doing, causes harm.
And the state’s response likewise does something: the state defines
torts, and court rules, so as to facilitate a damage award, a punitive
damages award, or a restraining order, in response to the harm
this speech causes. For the most part, when it does so, it is
facilitating a private remedy designed to require the actor to rectify
the wrongs done by his actions, and to internalize those costs.
The same would be true of a (hypothetical) civil action for
harms occasioned by hate speech or pornography. Yet, only with
respect to such harmful speech, are liberals, and possibly
Brettschneider (although it is not entirely clear), inclined to close
the courthouse door, and preclude not only criminal responses by
the state, but also civil responses by harmed citizens. But
why? Why is it only with respect to hate speech that the state must
not permit civil recourse? Why is it only the harms occasioned by
pornography or racist speech that inspire worries that any state
that allows civil remedies is thereby acting coercively, rather than
persuasively? What is so peculiar about hate speech, and the
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harms it occasions, that gives rise to the impulse to shield them
with protection against a civil state response?
More generally, the failure to define coercion, and its
reach, has additional normative consequences in Brettschneider’s
argument. To reverse Robert Cover’s insight from decades ago
that all state speech takes place on a field of violence,19 all
coercive state actions, from executions to the impositions of
regulatory fines, civil sanctions, parking tickets or taxes, also
take place within a field of persuasive words. There is often
coercion behind state attempts to be persuasive. Think of the
interactions between the pregnant woman seeking an abortion
and the abortion provider required to educate the woman with
respect to various attributes of the fetal life inside her. But
there is also often, perhaps very often and maybe even always,
persuasion behind the state’s attempts to coerce.
The efficacy of persuasive action requires an audience
and the state sometimes attempts to coerce attendance. Think
again of public education. Is it always wrong to require
attendance? If not, this suggests a continuum, rather than a
bright line, between acts of the state that are primarily
persuasive but accompanied by some measure of coercion—even if
just coerced attendance—and acts of coercion accompanied by
some measure of persuasion. Sometimes, the persuasion that
accompanies coercive state action is just obnoxious and grating
and we would be better off without it—just tell me what it will
cost me, don’t lecture me, when you’re imposing a traffic fine.
Sometimes, the coercion that might accompany persuasive action,
however, is justified. For example, think of the attachment of the
salary that accompanies the imposition of a civil or regulatory
fine, or as Brettschneider argues in some detail, the
withdrawal of a tax exemption from religious views that are
hateful. The tax exemption, however, is not an anomaly; it is,
rather, simply one example of a pervasive dynamic: persuasive
state speech accompanied by some measure of coercion. That
dynamic, I think, requires more general treatment.
A final concern goes to the narrowness of Brettschneider’s
thesis. Why are we focused so exclusively on the role of the
persuasive state in promoting race and sex equality, rather than
also on values pertaining to a fair or just distribution of resources?
Shouldn’t the persuasive state pursue, through persuasion, these
liberal values as well? The paradox Brettschneider discovers of the
state protecting hate speech for liberal reasons, even though the
19 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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speech it protects undermines liberalism, is not limited to the
context of speech and speech rights. Much of the dynamic
Brettschneider describes—of the back and forth between the
dystopic images of an overly invasive state on the one hand or a
hateful society on the other—is also true in the realm of economic
liberty and justice.
In part for liberal-sounding reasons regarding the dangers
of concentrated state power and the values of individualism and
entrepreneurship, we tend to let market-generated outcomes lie,
even when that results in massive inequalities in wealth, and
hence concentrations of economic power, which can squelch true
individualism and liberty in the private sector. Perhaps one way
out of this box as well as in the speech context would be to look at
the role of the persuasive state. A state that can explain its
commitment to markets might go some way toward undoing the
damage unregulated markets occasion; or on the other side, a
state that can explain its commitment to regulating them might
also bear a responsibility to explain how that regulation in fact
furthers the liberties that it seemingly constrains. A shift in focus
away from the pitfalls of the state’s coercive role in taxing and
redistributing wealth, or in regulating private markets, and
toward the potential of the state’s persuasive role in these
contexts, might yield benefits comparable to the shift in focus
that Brettschneider advocates, and largely accomplishes, in the
context of hate speech. Were we to try this, however, we’d face
some of the problems outlined above.
In addition to the invasive state and hateful society
dystopias, we would also have to contend with the inegalitarian
state, and the illiberal state, as well as the hypocritical or lamp-
posting state. We would have to contend with the various state
acts that impact distributive justice concerns, but where the
action is neither cleanly coercive nor cleanly persuasive, but
some combination of both. Here, the weakness of the “coercive
versus persuasive” understanding of the state would come into
sharp relief: the main way that the state effects distributive
justice is through its regulatory, taxing and spending authority,
all of which are viewed by some as fundamentally coercive, and by
others as the paradigmatic exercise in persuasive statecraft.
Similarly, its laws of inheritance, contract, and property rights,
all of which aim to give full sway to private choice, are viewed by
some—critical theorists most notably, but more generally, the
political left—as so coercive as to be theft, and by others—
primarily libertarians and liberals but some communitarians
as well—as the heart of civil society.
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In all of these areas the state’s acts of coercion are so
intertwined with acts of persuasion that it will be hard to
disentangle them, suggesting, I believe, the limits of the
distinction. It might be better in this context, as well as in the
context of hate speech, to look in a more granular way at the
specific acts the state has taken without categorizing them as
coercive or persuasive, and simply ask whether the state is
saying the right things when it speaks, as the wonderful title of
Brettschneider’s book suggests.
